Logging, OS security, cloud & container infrastructure, IAM, OT/ICS/SCADA, and indicators of malicious activity โ the foundation of every SOC analyst role.
This page covers the foundational sub-domains of Security Operations: security architecture, logging & monitoring, OS security concepts, cloud/container infrastructure, identity & access management, encryption, OT/ICS basics, and indicators of malicious activity. This is the "detection foundation" half of the domain โ the tools and threat intel half is on Page 2.
Log ingestion โ Logs must be collected from all relevant sources: endpoints, network devices, cloud services, applications, identity providers. A gap in ingestion = a blind spot.
OS hardening โ Reducing attack surface by removing unnecessary services, applying security baselines (CIS Benchmarks), and configuring security settings.
| LOLBin | Malicious Use | Detection Signal |
|---|---|---|
certutil.exe | Download files, decode Base64, decode malware | Unusual network connections from certutil |
PowerShell | Download+execute (IEX), encoded commands (-EncodedCommand), bypass execution policy | Encoded PS commands, AMSI bypass attempts |
wscript/cscript | Execute .vbs/.js malware scripts | Script execution from temp dirs |
mshta.exe | Execute malicious HTA files, run inline VBScript/JavaScript | mshta spawning child processes |
regsvr32.exe | Squiblydoo attack โ register remote .sct files via /i: flag | regsvr32 with network URLs |
rundll32.exe | Execute malicious DLLs, load JavaScript via scrobj.dll | rundll32 calling unusual exports |
bitsadmin | Download files, maintain persistence via BITS jobs | BITS jobs to external IPs |
OT (Operational Technology) environments control physical processes โ power grids, manufacturing, water treatment. They have unique security challenges compared to IT.
Indicators of compromise (IOCs) are artifacts that suggest a security incident. The CS0-004 exam tests identification of indicators from log excerpts and scenarios.
| Event ID | Event Name | Security Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| 4624 | Successful Logon | Baseline; watch for logon type 3 (network) or type 10 (remote interactive) |
| 4625 | Failed Logon | Multiple failures = brute force or password spray |
| 4648 | Logon with Explicit Credentials | Indicator of pass-the-hash or lateral movement |
| 4688 | Process Creation | Critical for detecting LOLBin abuse, malware execution |
| 4698 | Scheduled Task Created | Common persistence mechanism โ watch for tasks created outside change windows |
| 4720 | User Account Created | Unauthorized account creation = potential backdoor |
| 4732 | User Added to Privileged Group | Privilege escalation indicator |
| 4663 | Object Access | Access to sensitive files/directories |
| 4771 | Kerberos Pre-Auth Failed | AS-REP Roasting or Kerberoasting attempts |
| 7045 | New Service Installed | Malware persistence via Windows services |
| Provider | Audit/Activity Log | Network Log | Resource Log |
|---|---|---|---|
| AWS | CloudTrail | VPC Flow Logs | CloudWatch Logs |
| Azure | Azure Activity Log | NSG Flow Logs | Azure Monitor / Log Analytics |
| GCP | Cloud Audit Logs | VPC Flow Logs | Cloud Logging (formerly Stackdriver) |
| Protocol | Primary Use | Port | Security Weakness |
|---|---|---|---|
| Modbus | PLC communications, manufacturing | TCP 502 | No authentication, no encryption, commands accepted from any source |
| DNP3 | SCADA for utilities (power, water) | TCP/UDP 20000 | Weak authentication (SAv5 adds some), replay attacks possible |
| BACnet | Building automation (HVAC, access) | UDP 47808 | No encryption; BACnet/IP exposed on IT networks creates risk |
| EtherNet/IP | Industrial Ethernet (Rockwell/Allen-Bradley) | TCP 44818 | Authentication optional; vulnerable to replay/MITM |
| Profinet | Industrial Ethernet (Siemens) | Multiple | Device discovery broadcasts; limited access control |
| Indicator | Type | What to Look For in Logs |
|---|---|---|
| Impossible travel | Identity | Same user, two auth events, geographically impossible timeframe |
| BEC inbox rule | Application | New email rule forwarding to external; rule created shortly after new-location login |
| DNS tunneling | Network | Unusually long subdomain strings; high-frequency DNS queries to same domain |
| C2 beaconing | Network | Regular outbound connections at fixed intervals to same external IP |
| LOLBin abuse | Host | certutil/powershell spawning cmd.exe or making external connections |
| Data exfiltration | Network | Large outbound transfers, especially off-hours; unusual destination IPs |
powershell -EncodedCommand [long Base64 string] -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden. Which category of malicious activity does this represent?