Zero Trust Model, Intrusion Kill Chain, Diamond Model, SDN, micro-segmentation, threat vector & attack surface analysis — the conceptual bedrock every GDSA candidate must master.
This foundational domain establishes the mental models and frameworks that underpin all other GDSA domains. Exam questions here test your ability to apply these frameworks to real-world scenarios — not just recite definitions.
Attacker-centric frameworks for understanding, modeling, and disrupting intrusions
Never trust, always verify — the philosophy that drives modern architecture decisions
Software-defined networking and workload-level isolation to limit lateral movement
Systematically identifying and prioritizing attack paths into an environment
Minimizing the number of exposed, exploitable entry points across the environment
The GDSA exam tests defensive versatility — the ability to apply multiple overlapping controls across prevention, detection, and response. For this domain, expect scenario questions asking: "Given this attack at phase X of the Kill Chain, which control most efficiently disrupts it?" Know where in the attack lifecycle each control applies.
Traditional security relied on a hard perimeter: trust everything inside, block everything outside. This model has three fatal flaws that GDSA architecture directly addresses:
Click each concept to expand comprehensive study notes.
The Kill Chain maps an adversary's required steps to achieve their objective. Defenders who disrupt any phase prevent all subsequent phases — disruption at Delivery or earlier is highest value.
Check off each item as you master it. This domain is concept-heavy — focus on applying frameworks to scenarios, not memorizing definitions.
Be able to identify which phase an attack scenario is in and which controls disrupt it
Email filtering = Delivery; patching = Exploitation; EDR = Installation/C2; DLP = Actions on Objectives
Adversary, Capability, Infrastructure, Victim — each can be a pivot point to discover related attacks
NIST SP 800-207 is the authoritative reference; know the Policy Engine/Administrator/Enforcement Point components
Traditional = prevent breach. ZT/GDSA = assume breach, limit blast radius, detect and respond rapidly
SDN controller makes routing decisions centrally; forwarding hardware executes those decisions
VLANs = Layer 2 broadcast domain isolation. Micro-seg = workload-level policy enforcement including east-west traffic
Vector = the path (phishing, web). Surface = the totality of exploitable entry points
List all ingress paths, prioritize by likelihood × impact, map to Kill Chain phases
CIS Benchmarks, disable unnecessary protocols, application whitelisting, remove legacy systems
Defense in depth uses all three — exam tests whether you can identify which type a given control belongs to
A GDSA architecture must have all three — not just prevention. Know which controls go in each layer
Network-centric = firewalls, IDS, segmentation. Data-centric = DLP, WAF, encryption. GDSA combines both
Example: NGFW = Technical control, disrupts Delivery and C2 phases
ZT removes implicit trust from internal users — least-privilege and behavior monitoring apply to insiders too
Focus on the three ZTA deployment models and the logical components (PE, PA, PEP)
Framework comparisons and key model details for rapid review.
| Kill Chain | ATT&CK Equivalent |
|---|---|
| Reconnaissance | Reconnaissance TA0043 |
| Weaponization | Resource Development TA0042 |
| Delivery | Initial Access TA0001 |
| Exploitation | Execution TA0002 |
| Installation | Persistence TA0003 |
| C2 | Command & Control TA0011 |
| Actions | Exfiltration TA0010 / Impact TA0040 |
| Element | Key Questions |
|---|---|
| Adversary | Who? What motivation? What sophistication? |
| Capability | What TTPs? What malware/tools? Custom or off-shelf? |
| Infrastructure | Which IPs/domains? Shared hosting? Bulletproof? |
| Victim | Which org/person? Why targeted? What data at risk? |
| Control | Disrupts Phase(s) |
|---|---|
| Email filtering / SPF/DKIM/DMARC | Delivery |
| Web proxy / URL filtering | Delivery, C2 |
| Patch management | Exploitation |
| EDR / application control | Installation |
| DNS sinkholing | C2 |
| Network segmentation / micro-seg | Actions (lateral movement) |
| DLP | Actions (exfiltration) |
| Threat intel / IOC feeds | All phases |
| Aspect | Perimeter | Zero Trust |
|---|---|---|
| Trust basis | Network location | Identity + device health |
| Internal traffic | Trusted by default | Verified every session |
| Lateral movement | Unrestricted internally | Blocked by micro-segmentation |
| Breach assumption | Try to prevent | Assume it happens; limit damage |
| Insider threats | Poorly addressed | Explicitly addressed |
| Feature | Traditional | SDN/Micro-seg |
|---|---|---|
| Traffic inspection | North-south only | East-west included |
| Policy granularity | VLAN/subnet | Individual workload |
| Response speed | Manual reconfiguration | Automated, real-time |
| Policy management | Per-device | Centralized controller |
| Principle | What It Means |
|---|---|
| Defense in Depth | Multiple independent control layers |
| Least Privilege | Minimum access required for function |
| Presumption of Compromise | Design for breach containment |
| Reduce Attack Surface | Eliminate unnecessary exposure |
| Prevent + Detect + Respond | All three tiers required |
| Network + Data-centric | Controls at both layers |
6 exam-style scenario questions. The GDSA exam favors application over memorization.
Foundations require conceptual depth — plan 1.5–2 weeks for this domain.
Ignoring the value of detection at later phases
Candidates answer "phase 1 disruption is always best" but the exam expects nuance — a control that detects at phase 6 (C2) while allowing phases 1-5 still provides critical intelligence about ongoing campaigns and enables response.
Prevention at early phases is preferred. But detection at any phase is valuable — it enables response. A mature architecture does both. The exam often asks for the "most effective" single control, which is typically early-phase prevention.
VLANs don't prevent east-west lateral movement
Answering that "VLANs provide micro-segmentation" — incorrect. VLANs create broadcast domain isolation at Layer 2 but all hosts within a VLAN can communicate freely. An attacker compromising one host in a VLAN can pivot to all others in that VLAN.
Micro-segmentation enforces policy at the individual workload level, inspecting and controlling east-west (intra-VLAN) traffic. It's implemented via SDN, hypervisor firewalls, or cloud security groups — not traditional VLANs.
ZT is a philosophy and architecture, not a technology
Selecting answers like "deploy Zero Trust firewall" or "Zero Trust replaces the perimeter firewall." Zero Trust is an architecture philosophy — it uses many existing technologies (MFA, micro-segmentation, identity management) orchestrated around the principle of continuous verification.
Zero Trust requires: (1) Strong identity verification for every access request. (2) Device health assessment. (3) Least-privilege access. (4) Continuous monitoring and re-verification. Multiple technologies work together — it's not a single product.
GDSA specifically tests the network + data-centric combination
When asked to "design a defensible architecture," candidates list only network controls (firewall, IDS, segmentation) and miss data-centric controls (DLP, database activity monitoring, WAF). GDSA explicitly tests both layers.
Defensible Security Architecture = network-centric controls + data-centric controls. Network controls defend transit; data-centric controls protect data at rest, in use, and in transit regardless of which network it's on.
Perimeter thinking doesn't address insider threats
Treating insider threats as only "malicious employees" and ignoring the larger category of compromised insiders — legitimate user accounts used by external attackers after credential theft, which is the most common real-world pivot scenario.
Zero Trust treats any access attempt as potentially compromised — including from internal users with valid credentials. Behavioral analytics, least-privilege, and continuous re-verification catch compromised insiders that perimeter defenses miss entirely.