CompTIA Security+ PBQ Practice: SY0-701 & SY0-801 (V8)
Interactive performance-based questions with instant scoring: drag-and-drop matching, configuration tasks and log analysis. Practice for the current SY0-701 exam or the new SY0-801 (V8) exam launching Nov 17, 2026.
How many PBQs are on the Security+ exam?
CompTIA doesn't publish a fixed number. Test-takers commonly report 3–5 PBQs, usually at the start of the exam, and the count varies between exam forms. The exam has a maximum of 90 questions in 90 minutes, and both SY0-701 and SY0-801 include PBQs.
Choose your exam version: SY0-701 PBQs (30) · SY0-801 (V8) PBQs (15)
Security+ SY0-701 PBQ Examples
3 worked SY0-701 PBQ examples. 30 SY0-701 PBQs in total; up to 2 per available type are free with no account.
Drag & Drop · Threats, Attacks & Vulnerabilities
Match Attack Types to Categories
A security analyst is reviewing recent incident reports. Each incident involves a different type of attack. Match each attack to its correct category.
Match each item to one of: Social Engineering · Injection Attack · Denial of Service · Malware · Physical Attack
- Phishing Email
- SQL Injection
- SYN Flood
- Ransomware
- Shoulder Surfing
Show answer and explanation
- Phishing Email → Social Engineering
- SQL Injection → Injection Attack
- SYN Flood → Denial of Service
- Ransomware → Malware
- Shoulder Surfing → Physical Attack
Phishing is a social engineering attack that manipulates users into revealing information. SQL Injection exploits application input fields to execute malicious database queries. SYN Flood overwhelms a server with connection requests (DoS). Ransomware is malware that encrypts files for ransom. Shoulder surfing is a physical attack where someone observes your screen or keyboard.
Configuration · Security Architecture
Configure Firewall Rules for a DMZ
You are configuring firewall rules for a company's DMZ (Demilitarized Zone). The DMZ hosts a public web server and a mail server. Configure each rule to properly secure the network while allowing necessary traffic.
Configure firewall rules for a DMZ hosting a web server (HTTP/HTTPS) and mail server (SMTP/IMAP). Internal network should not be directly accessible from the internet.
- Internet → Web Server (HTTPS): Allow / Deny
- Internet → Web Server (HTTP): Allow / Deny
- Internet → Mail Server (SMTP): Allow / Deny
- Internet → Internal Network (Any): Allow / Deny
- Internet → Web Server (Telnet): Allow / Deny
- Internal → Internet (HTTPS): Allow / Deny
Show answer and explanation
- Internet → Web Server (HTTPS): Allow
- Internet → Web Server (HTTP): Allow
- Internet → Mail Server (SMTP): Allow
- Internet → Internal Network (Any): Deny
- Internet → Web Server (Telnet): Deny
- Internal → Internet (HTTPS): Allow
The web server needs HTTPS (443) and HTTP (80) allowed for public access. The mail server needs SMTP (25) for receiving email. Direct internet access to the internal network must be denied — this is the core purpose of a DMZ. Telnet (port 23) should always be denied as it transmits data in plaintext. Internal users should be allowed outbound HTTPS for web browsing.
Log Analysis · Security Operations
Analyze Web Server Attack Logs
You are a security analyst reviewing web server access logs after an alert was triggered. Analyze the following log entries to identify the attack and take appropriate action.
192.168.1.105 - - [10/Feb/2026:14:23:01 +0000] "GET /login.php HTTP/1.1" 200 3421
192.168.1.105 - - [10/Feb/2026:14:23:03 +0000] "POST /login.php HTTP/1.1" 401 234
192.168.1.105 - - [10/Feb/2026:14:23:04 +0000] "POST /login.php HTTP/1.1" 401 234
192.168.1.105 - - [10/Feb/2026:14:23:05 +0000] "POST /login.php HTTP/1.1" 401 234
192.168.1.105 - - [10/Feb/2026:14:23:06 +0000] "POST /login.php HTTP/1.1" 401 234
192.168.1.105 - - [10/Feb/2026:14:23:07 +0000] "POST /login.php HTTP/1.1" 401 234
192.168.1.105 - - [10/Feb/2026:14:23:08 +0000] "POST /login.php HTTP/1.1" 200 8827
- What type of attack is shown in these logs? (SQL Injection / Brute Force Attack / Cross-Site Scripting / Directory Traversal)
- What is the attacker's IP address? (10.0.0.1 / 192.168.1.105 / 127.0.0.1 / Cannot be determined)
- What does the final HTTP 200 status indicate? (The server crashed / The attacker successfully logged in / The attack was blocked / The connection was reset)
Show answer and explanation
- Brute Force Attack
- 192.168.1.105
- The attacker successfully logged in
The logs show multiple rapid POST requests to login.php with 401 (Unauthorized) responses followed by a 200 (Success) — a classic brute force pattern. The attacker (192.168.1.105) tried multiple credentials until one worked. The 200 response at the end indicates a successful login. Mitigation includes account lockout policies, rate limiting, and MFA.
Security+ SY0-801 (V8) PBQ Examples
SY0-801 launches on or around November 17, 2026. These practice PBQs are written against the final SY0-801 objectives, including AI threats, email authentication and identity attacks. 15 SY0-801 PBQs in total; up to 2 per available type are free. SY0-801 practice questions
Drag & Drop · Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Attacks
Match AI attack scenarios to the AI threat
Northwind Analytics is reviewing incidents and red-team findings involving its AI tools. Drag each scenario to the AI threat it best represents. Read carefully: who is manipulating what, and at which stage (training data, input, or output)?
Match each item to one of: Prompt injection · Data poisoning · Jailbreaking · Model evasion · Data loss · Hallucination
- A résumé hides white-on-white text telling the AI screening assistant to rank this candidate first
- A web page the AI browsing agent summarizes contains hidden text instructing it to email the user's files out
- A user tells the public chatbot to role-play an AI 'with no rules' to get malware steps it normally refuses
- Attackers seed a crowd-sourced training set with mislabeled samples so spam with a trigger word is rated safe
- Malware authors append benign code to a binary until the deployed ML antivirus scores it as clean
- An engineer pastes proprietary source code into a public AI chatbot that keeps prompts for model training
- An AI coding assistant confidently recommends importing a package that does not exist in any registry
Show answer and explanation
- A résumé hides white-on-white text telling the AI screening assistant to rank this candidate first → Prompt injection
- A web page the AI browsing agent summarizes contains hidden text instructing it to email the user's files out → Prompt injection
- A user tells the public chatbot to role-play an AI 'with no rules' to get malware steps it normally refuses → Jailbreaking
- Attackers seed a crowd-sourced training set with mislabeled samples so spam with a trigger word is rated safe → Data poisoning
- Malware authors append benign code to a binary until the deployed ML antivirus scores it as clean → Model evasion
- An engineer pastes proprietary source code into a public AI chatbot that keeps prompts for model training → Data loss
- An AI coding assistant confidently recommends importing a package that does not exist in any registry → Hallucination
Prompt injection: the hidden résumé text and the hidden web-page text are instructions smuggled into content the model processes, overriding the application's intended instructions (indirect prompt injection). Jailbreaking: the role-play request is the user directly talking the model out of its own safety guardrails to get prohibited output; no third-party content is involved, which is what separates it from prompt injection. Data poisoning: corrupting the training set plants a backdoor before the model is ever deployed. Model evasion: the malware author changes the input at inference time so a trained classifier misjudges it; the model itself is untouched, which separates evasion from poisoning. Data loss: sensitive code leaves the organization through a public AI service that retains prompts. Hallucination: the assistant invents a package that does not exist; attackers can register such names (slopsquatting), so the hallucination becomes a supply-chain risk. (SY0-801 2.6)
Configuration · Security Operations
Stop spoofing of example.com with SPF, DKIM, DMARC and BIMI
Attackers are sending invoice-fraud emails that appear to come from billing@example.com, and receivers are delivering them because the domain's email authentication is weak. You are the email security lead at Example Corp. Configure the DNS records and settings so that only the two legitimate senders can send as example.com, failures are rejected, you receive aggregate reports, and the domain becomes eligible to display its logo through BIMI.
Domain: example.com. Legitimate senders: (1) Microsoft 365 for staff mail, authorized by include:spf.protection.outlook.com; (2) a marketing platform that sends newsletters from example.com, authorized by include:_spf.mailer.example.net. No other system may send as example.com. Current SPF TXT record: "v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com ?all" (the marketing platform is missing and ?all is neutral). A DKIM key pair has been generated for selector "selector1" and both senders are set to sign with d=example.com; the public key has not yet been published. Current DMARC record at _dmarc.example.com: "v=DMARC1; p=none". Thirty days of p=none aggregate reports confirm that these two services are the only legitimate sources of example.com mail. Requirements: (a) unauthorized senders must hard-fail SPF; (b) receivers must reject, not just quarantine, messages that fail DMARC; (c) the DKIM signing domain must exactly match the From domain, so a subdomain signature must not satisfy alignment; (d) daily aggregate (not forensic) reports go to dmarc-reports@example.com; (e) marketing wants the company logo shown in inboxes via BIMI.
- SPF TXT record for example.com: v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_spf.mailer.example.net -all / v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_spf.mailer.example.net ?all / v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_spf.mailer.example.net +all / v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all
- DKIM record to publish: selector1._domainkey.example.com TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=<public key>" / selector1._domainkey.example.com TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=<private key>" / _dmarc.example.com TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=<public key>" / example.com MX 10 selector1.example.com
- DMARC policy tag: p=none / p=quarantine / p=reject / sp=none
- DMARC DKIM alignment tag: adkim=s / adkim=r / aspf=r / fo=1
- DMARC reporting tag: rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example.com / ruf=mailto:dmarc-reports@example.com / rf=afrf / pct=100
- Prerequisite that must be in place before the BIMI record will be honored: DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject with pct=100 / DMARC at p=none so no legitimate mail is lost / An SPF record ending in ~all instead of -all / A DNSSEC-signed zone for example.com
Show answer and explanation
- SPF TXT record for example.com: v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_spf.mailer.example.net -all
- DKIM record to publish: selector1._domainkey.example.com TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=<public key>"
- DMARC policy tag: p=reject
- DMARC DKIM alignment tag: adkim=s
- DMARC reporting tag: rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example.com
- Prerequisite that must be in place before the BIMI record will be honored: DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject with pct=100
SPF must list both legitimate senders and end in -all so every other source hard-fails; ?all is neutral and +all authorizes the whole internet, while dropping the marketing include would make legitimate newsletters fail. DKIM public keys are published as a TXT record at <selector>._domainkey.<domain>; the private key never goes in DNS, and _dmarc is the DMARC location, not DKIM's. Because monitoring shows legitimate mail passing, the policy can move to p=reject; p=quarantine is tempting but only sends failures to spam, which does not meet the reject requirement. adkim=s enforces strict DKIM alignment so a signature from a subdomain does not count, whereas adkim=r (the default) allows organizational-domain matches. rua requests aggregate reports; ruf requests forensic (failure) reports, which is what the requirement excludes. BIMI is honored only when the domain enforces DMARC at quarantine or reject (pct=100); a p=none domain is never eligible, ~all is a softfail SPF setting that BIMI does not depend on, and BIMI does not require DNSSEC (some mailbox providers additionally require a Verified Mark Certificate, but DMARC enforcement is the prerequisite here). (SY0-801 4.1)
Log Analysis · Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Attacks
Push prompts until yes: MFA fatigue in an IdP sign-in log
Practice PBQ for the SY0-801 objectives. A help-desk analyst at Example Corp is reviewing identity-provider sign-in events for accountant J. Alvarez, who normally works from Denver and complained about 'a burst of weird phone notifications' at 2 a.m. local time. Review the log and answer the questions about what happened and how to stop it recurring.
2026-09-14T16:42:10Z idp=sso.example.com user=j.alvarez@example.com src_ip=198.51.100.20 geo=US-Denver app=Outlook-Web primary_auth=success mfa_method=push mfa_result=approved
2026-09-15T08:11:03Z idp=sso.example.com user=j.alvarez@example.com src_ip=203.0.113.45 geo=RO-Bucharest app=Outlook-Web primary_auth=success mfa_method=push mfa_result=denied
2026-09-15T08:11:58Z idp=sso.example.com user=j.alvarez@example.com src_ip=203.0.113.45 geo=RO-Bucharest app=Outlook-Web primary_auth=success mfa_method=push mfa_result=timeout
2026-09-15T08:12:51Z idp=sso.example.com user=j.alvarez@example.com src_ip=203.0.113.45 geo=RO-Bucharest app=Outlook-Web primary_auth=success mfa_method=push mfa_result=denied
2026-09-15T08:13:40Z idp=sso.example.com user=j.alvarez@example.com src_ip=203.0.113.45 geo=RO-Bucharest app=Outlook-Web primary_auth=success mfa_method=push mfa_result=timeout
2026-09-15T08:14:33Z idp=sso.example.com user=j.alvarez@example.com src_ip=203.0.113.45 geo=RO-Bucharest app=Outlook-Web primary_auth=success mfa_method=push mfa_result=denied
2026-09-15T08:15:29Z idp=sso.example.com user=j.alvarez@example.com src_ip=203.0.113.45 geo=RO-Bucharest app=Outlook-Web primary_auth=success mfa_method=push mfa_result=timeout
2026-09-15T08:16:22Z idp=sso.example.com user=j.alvarez@example.com src_ip=203.0.113.45 geo=RO-Bucharest app=Outlook-Web primary_auth=success mfa_method=push mfa_result=denied
2026-09-15T08:17:47Z idp=sso.example.com user=j.alvarez@example.com src_ip=203.0.113.45 geo=RO-Bucharest app=Outlook-Web primary_auth=success mfa_method=push mfa_result=approved session_id=a91c-77e2
2026-09-15T08:19:05Z idp=sso.example.com user=j.alvarez@example.com src_ip=203.0.113.45 event=mfa_method_registered method=authenticator_app device="Unknown Android" session_id=a91c-77e2
2026-09-15T08:21:30Z app=Outlook-Web user=j.alvarez@example.com src_ip=203.0.113.45 event=inbox_rule_created rule="fwd-all" action=forward_to:ar-archive@example.net session_id=a91c-77e2
- Which attack does the sequence from 203.0.113.45 represent? (MFA fatigue (push bombing) / Password spraying / Session token replay / SIM swapping)
- What does primary_auth=success on every 203.0.113.45 line tell you? (The attacker already knows the user's valid password / The attacker bypassed the password using a stolen session cookie / The attacker is brute-forcing the password one guess per prompt / The IdP failed open and skipped password checks)
- Which log entry shows the attack succeeded? (08:17:47Z mfa_result=approved from 203.0.113.45 / 16:42:10Z mfa_result=approved from 198.51.100.20 / 08:11:03Z mfa_result=denied from 203.0.113.45 / 08:15:29Z mfa_result=timeout from 203.0.113.45)
- Which control would best prevent this attack from working again? (Require number matching for push approvals / Extend the push approval window to 120 seconds / Replace push with SMS one-time passcodes / Shorten password expiration to 30 days)
- What is the best immediate containment step for this account? (Revoke sessions, reset the password, remove the new authenticator and the fwd-all rule / Revoke sessions and reset the password; keep the newly registered authenticator app / Block 203.0.113.45 at the firewall, then close the ticket as resolved / Lower the account lockout threshold to three failed passwords)
Show answer and explanation
- MFA fatigue (push bombing)
- The attacker already knows the user's valid password
- 08:17:47Z mfa_result=approved from 203.0.113.45
- Require number matching for push approvals
- Revoke sessions, reset the password, remove the new authenticator and the fwd-all rule
Every 203.0.113.45 line shows primary_auth=success, so the attacker already had J. Alvarez's password and only needed the second factor; seven push prompts in about five minutes followed by mfa_result=approved at 08:17:47Z is the signature of MFA fatigue, where a tired or confused user finally taps Approve. It is not password spraying (one account, password already correct) or session token replay (there is a fresh MFA approval and a new session_id). The attacker then established persistence by registering their own authenticator at 08:19:05Z and created a forwarding rule at 08:21:30Z, so containment must revoke the session, reset the password, remove that authenticator and delete the rule; a session revoke and password reset alone, or blocking one IP, leave the attacker's own MFA device in place. Number matching forces the user to type a code shown on the sign-in screen, which the victim never sees, so a blind tap no longer works (FIDO2 passkeys would also stop it); a longer push window makes fatigue easier, and SMS OTP is weaker, not stronger. (SY0-801 2.5)
PBQ Question Types
Drag & Drop Matching
Match security concepts, threats, protocols, and controls to their correct categories.
Configuration
Choose the right settings for firewalls, email records, access policies and backups in a described environment.
Log Analysis
Read security logs, system events, and audit trails to identify attacks, key evidence and the best response.
Security+ PBQ Practice: Frequently Asked Questions
What are Security+ PBQs?
Performance-based questions (PBQs) are interactive Security+ tasks. Instead of picking one answer, you drag and drop items, complete a configuration, or analyze a log to show practical skill. Both SY0-701 and SY0-801 include them.
How many PBQs are on the Security+ exam?
CompTIA doesn't publish a fixed number. Test-takers commonly report 3–5 PBQs, usually at the start of the exam, and the count varies between exam forms. The exam has a maximum of 90 questions in 90 minutes, and both SY0-701 and SY0-801 include PBQs.
Does Security+ SY0-801 (V8) have PBQs?
Yes. The SY0-801 exam objectives list multiple-choice and performance-based questions, the same as SY0-701. Our SY0-801 PBQs practice the V8 objectives, including new topics such as AI threats, email authentication and identity attacks. How real V8 PBQs look will only be known after the exam launches on or around November 17, 2026.
What types of PBQs appear on Security+?
Security+ PBQ types include drag-and-drop matching (categorizing threats, protocols, or controls), configuration scenarios (firewall rules, email records, access policies), and log analysis (identifying attacks from system logs). FlashGenius offers practice for all three types.
Should I skip PBQs on the Security+ exam?
Many test-takers flag PBQs and return to them after the multiple-choice questions, so they answer quicker questions first and spend the remaining time on PBQs. Practicing PBQs beforehand builds the confidence to tackle them directly.
Why Practice PBQs on FlashGenius?
- 45 interactive PBQ scenarios currently available, for SY0-701 and SY0-801
- Exam-like interface with drag-and-drop, configuration panels, and log viewers
- Instant feedback with detailed explanations
- Up to 2 free PBQs per available type in each populated exam version; no account required to start. Empty banks have no PBQs available yet.
Related Security+ Resources